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  <controlfield tag="008">180718b2017   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Hu, Chunyan</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Accountability of public servants under dominant political settlements of China: effects, challenges, and issues</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">2017</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">p.240-255.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="362" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Feb</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Some scholars think that accountability is attainable only under the electoral political system. However, it is argued that China could achieve some weak accountability even without general election system. How could this be achieved in China? The paper attempts to analyze this question with the following steps: first, it describes the specific accountability system by categorizing different approaches based on four dimensions, then focuses on the impacts that these approaches would have, which are based on finance, fairness and efficiency. It is concluded that under a dominant political settlement, only weak accountability exists in China, not real or strong accountability. - Reproduced.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Accountability - China</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Civil service - China</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Civil service</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">International Journal of Public Administration</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="909" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">115317</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">115311</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">115311</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="0">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="1">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="4">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="7">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="h">Volume no: 40, Issue no: 3</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">AR115777</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="w">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">AR</subfield>
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