01627pab a2200193 454500008004000000100002500040245008700065260000900152300001500161362000800176520100200184650003201186650002201218650001401240773004401254909001101298999001901309952010501328180718b2017   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aShashi Bhushan Kumar  aDiscretionary powers of the governor: constitutional vision and observed realities  c2017  ap.402-417.  aSep  aRight from the adoption of the Indian Constitution a hot debate is going on regarding discretionary power of governors. The Office of the Governor, not being an elected constitutional functionary, has been in the eye of a storm. Our Constitution makers wanted a governor who would act as a friend and sagacious advisor of the Council of Ministers. He should be a person who is expected to be above party and politics. But very soon these pious hopes were shattered. Arguments and counter-arguments started generating more heat but less light after 1967 because most of the state legislatures were captured by the non-Congress parties. The governors came to be seen or suspected as the agents of the union government. The present article is a brief narration of governorﾒs discretionary powers as our founding fathers hoped and how governors have actually behaved with such powers just to please the leadership of the party in power at the centre contrary to the vision of the makers. - Reproduce  aDiscretionary power - India  aGovernors - India  aGovernors  aIndian Journal of Public Administration  a116205  c116199d116199  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 63, Issue no: 3pAR116665r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR