01355pab a2200121 454500008004000000100002100040245006700061260000900128300001500137520102900152650002601181773002601207180718b2017   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aMiller, Susan M.  aHow electoral incentives shape performance measurement efforts  c2017  ap.623-637.  aAlthough scholars have assessed how the electoral connection of legislators and chief executives affects their support for performance measurement, we know less about how electoral considerations might influence agency administrators' focus on performance measurement. I suggest that independently elected administrators' attention to their agency's performance measurement system may be conditional on the likelihood that their efforts in this area will help them realize their electoral goals. Because there is a greater electoral incentive to focus on performance issues when government performance is deficient, elected administrators should be as likely as, if not more likely than, their non-elected counterparts to focus on performance measurement when the government is performing poorly and less likely to do so when the government is performing well. I find evidence that supports this expectation. This article provides insight into the implications of electoral incentives for management decisions. - Reproduced.  aPerformance appraisal  aPublic Administration