01419pab a2200217 454500008004000000100001500040245006100055260000900116300001500125362001200140520078800152650001000940650002100950650001500971700002200986700002501008773003301033909001101066999001901077952010501096180718b2017   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aLiu, Cheol  aCorruption and state and local government debt expansion  c2017  ap.681-690.  aSep-Oct  aTheories describing rent seeking in the public sector posit a number of negative fiscal outcomes that the choices of corrupt officials may generate. The evidence presented in this article shows that states with greater intensities of public corruption have higher aggregate levels of state and local debt. If corruption in the 10 most corrupt states were only at an average level, their public debt would be 9 percent lower, or about $249.35 per capita, all else being equal. Notably, institutional control measures may not have succeeded in restraining the expansion of state and local public debt in the presence of greater levels of corruption. State and local governments would achieve more efficient levels of fiscal discipline by curbing public sector corruption. - Reproduced.  aDebts  aLocal government  aCorruption  aMikesell, John L.  aMoldogaziev, Tima T.  aPublic Administration Review  a116488  c116482d116482  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 77, Issue no: 5pAR116948r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR