01313pab a2200145 454500008004000000100002100040245011500061260000900176300001300185520088800198650001501086650002401101650001601125773002601141180718b2018   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aRimkute, Dovile   aOrganizational reputation and risk regulation: the effect of reputational threats on agency scientific outputs  c2018  ap.70-83.  aThis article aims to explain the variation in the scientific risk assessments conducted by two regulatory agencies: the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES). To explain the merits of scientific risk assessments that have caused polarization within the EU, this article draws on bureaucratic reputation theory. The theory argues that regulators are political organizations that are active in protecting their unique organizational reputations. The findings obtained from interviews, direct observations, and primary documents yield support for this framework: depending on reputational threats, agencies choose to emphasize either their role as guardians of the prevailing social values, or send strong professional signals by delivering a scientifically rigorous risk assessment. - Reproduced.  aRegulation  aRegulatory agencies  aBureaucracy  aPublic Administration