01367pab a2200169 454500 180718b2018 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Rimkute, Dovile Organizational reputation and risk regulation: the effect of reputational threats on agency scientific outputs 2018 p.70-83. This article aims to explain the variation in the scientific risk assessments conducted by two regulatory agencies: the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES). To explain the merits of scientific risk assessments that have caused polarization within the EU, this article draws on bureaucratic reputation theory. The theory argues that regulators are political organizations that are active in protecting their unique organizational reputations. The findings obtained from interviews, direct observations, and primary documents yield support for this framework: depending on reputational threats, agencies choose to emphasize either their role as guardians of the prevailing social values, or send strong professional signals by delivering a scientifically rigorous risk assessment. - Reproduced. Regulation Regulatory agencies Bureaucracy Public Administration 117041 117035 117035 0 0 0 0 IIPA IIPA 2018-07-19 Volume no: 96, Issue no: 1 AR117501 2018-07-19 2018-07-19 AR