01213pab a2200169 454500008003600000100002100036245003700057520071900094650001600813650001300829650001200842650001500854773004100869909000900910999001500919952010900934180718b   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aGrand, Julian Le  aThe theory of government failure  aThis article outlines a theory of government failure that parallels the more well-established theory of market failure. It builds on the work of the public choice school concerning the behaviour of governments under the assumption that all relevant agents pursue their self-interest. It examines the theoretical consequences for efficiency and equity of three kinds of government activity: provision, subsidy and regulation. The conclusion is reached that all three may creat inefficiency and inequity, but that the form and magniture of the failure will differ with the type of activity, hence it is import that the three are distinguishes. It is also emphasised that the extent of government failure in each case  a Government  a Failure  a Theory  aGovernment  aBritish Journal of Political Science  a1936  c1936d1936  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hIssue no: 1(4), Oct.91, p.423-42pAR1936r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR