01595pab a2200145 454500008004000000100002100040245007900061260000900140300001400149362001100163520119100174650003701365650002101402773002601423180718b1998   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aBoyne, George A.  aCompetitive tendering in local government: a review of theory and evidence  c1998  ap.695-712  aWinter  aThe introduction of compulsory competitive tendering in UK local government reflected conventional public choice theories of bureaucracy. These theories suggest that competition for service contracts will lead to lower expenditure and higher efficiency. Extensions and criticisms of the classical public choice model yield very different conclusions. First, the problems of bureaucratic supply are less severe than originally assumed, and secondly competition may itself generate new problems such as transaction costs, erosion of trust between principals and agents, and rent seeking. The impact of competition on spending and efficiency is therefore indeterminate, and must be established empirically. However, studies which evaluate the effects of competitive tendering in local government are few in number, cover a limited range of services, and are methodologically flawed. Therefore neither the initial imposition of competitive tendering by the Conservatives, nor its planned abolition by Labour, can be traced to a solid foundation of theoretical or empirical support. Theoretical and methodological problems that need to be resolved by further empirical studies are identified  aLocal government - Great Britain  aLocal government  aPublic Administration