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  <controlfield tag="008">180718b1998   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Sarkar, Jayati</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Deregulation and the limits to banking market competition: some insights from India</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">1998</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">p.29-42</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="362" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Jul</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Policy-makers around the world have emphasized the virtues of deregulation since the 1980s. In financial markets, deregulation has taken the form of removal of barriers to entry and licensing policies, as well as the dismantling of regulated interest rate regimes. These measures have been widely acclaimed as the harbingers of competition, competition being the stepping stone to higher levels of efficiency. Using theoretical caveats from the industrial organization literature and empirical evidence from the Indian banking industry, this paper argues that entry and branching deregulation and interest rate liberalization might not be the panacea that many policy-makers make them out to be. Specifically, the paper argues that competition might not naturally follow such deregulation if the incumbents are well entrenched in their market segments by virtue of sheer size and greater accessibility to customers. - Reproduced</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Banks - India</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Banks</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">International Journal of Development Banking</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="909" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">40624</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">40624</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">40624</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="0">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="1">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="4">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="7">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="h">Volume no: 16, Issue no: 2</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">AR40999</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="w">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">AR</subfield>
  </datafield>
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