01536pab a2200193 454500008004000000100001900040245008800059260000900147300001200156362000800168520093300176650001801109650001001127700002501137773004901162909001001211999001701221952010401238180718b1998   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aSarkar, Jayati  aDeregulation and the limits to banking market competition: some insights from India  c1998  ap.29-42  aJul  aPolicy-makers around the world have emphasized the virtues of deregulation since the 1980s. In financial markets, deregulation has taken the form of removal of barriers to entry and licensing policies, as well as the dismantling of regulated interest rate regimes. These measures have been widely acclaimed as the harbingers of competition, competition being the stepping stone to higher levels of efficiency. Using theoretical caveats from the industrial organization literature and empirical evidence from the Indian banking industry, this paper argues that entry and branching deregulation and interest rate liberalization might not be the panacea that many policy-makers make them out to be. Specifically, the paper argues that competition might not naturally follow such deregulation if the incumbents are well entrenched in their market segments by virtue of sheer size and greater accessibility to customers. - Reproduced  aBanks - India  aBanks  aBhaumik, Sumon Kumar  aInternational Journal of Development Banking  a40624  c40624d40624  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 16, Issue no: 2pAR40999r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR