01177pab a2200193 454500008004000000100002100040245011500061260000900176300001200185362001200197520055300209650001900762650002700781650001100808773003300819909001000852999001700862952010400879180718b2001   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aSavage, James D.  aBudgetary collective action problems: convergence and compliance under the Maastricht Treaty on European Union  c2001  ap.43-53  aJan-Feb  aBudgetary agreements may be thought of as collective action problems in which the problem at hand is maintaining group cohesion by controlling free riders.  The standard solution to the free rider problem includes monitoring group behavior and imposing sanctions.  This article analyzes the collective action problem present in the budgetary provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the Economic Monetary Union, by focusing on the four stages of budgetary compliance that are evident in all budgetary agreements and treaties. - Reproduced  aEuropean union  aBudget - United States  aBudget  aPublic Administration Review  a49193  c49193d49193  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 61, Issue no: 1pAR49621r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR