01214pab a2200133 454500008004000000100002700040245009600067260000900163300001300172362001200185520083200197650001801029773003301047180718b2001   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aKoppell, Jonathan G.S.  aHybrid organizations and the alignment of interests: the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  c2001  ap.468-82  aJul-Aug  aThis article explores the political influence of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).  Using Congress's overhaul of the regulatory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a case study, the article presents two principal findings: (1) The characteristics that distinguish government-sponsored enterprises from traditional government agencies and private companies endow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources; and (2) the alignment of interest groups around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is subject to strategic manipulation by the GSEs.  A triangular model of this alignment is proposed and employed to analyze the legislative outcome.  The case has implications for students of organizational theory as well as policy makers considering the use of GSEs or other hybrid organizations. - Reproduced  aPublic sector  aPublic Administration Review