01579pab a2200169 454500 180718b2001 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Amado, Rivka Checks, balances, and appointments in the public service: Israeli experience in comparative perspective 2001 p.569-84 Sep-Oct This article explores the process of appointing government ministers and senior executive officials in Israel. It provides several case studies of the appointment process in the 1990s, a period of hyperfragmentation in the Israeli parliament. These studies reveal evidence of gross irresponsibility in the appointment process, as well as a lack of a meaningful oversight and checks in the process. One consequence is that the Israeli High Court was asked to intervene and review and reject a number of these appointments. The article argues that although well meaning, this intervention represents a dangerous new trend; this new role for the Courts is both inappropriate and counterproductive. It is inappropriate because judicial intervention imposes a legal solution when a political solution is called for, and it is counterproductive because frequent judicial intervention weakens both the judiciary and the political process. The article concludes with a proposal for an alternative approach to cope with the lack of meaningful oversight in the political-appointment process. - Reproduced Civil service - Israel Civil service Public Administration Review 50213 50213 50213 0 0 0 0 IIPA IIPA 2018-07-19 Volume no: 61, Issue no: 5 AR50641 2018-07-19 2018-07-19 AR