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  <controlfield tag="008">181130s2018    xx            000 0 und d</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Dohler, Marian</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Discovering the dark side of power: </subfield>
    <subfield code="b">the principal&#xFFFD;s moral hazard in political-bureaucratic relations</subfield>
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    <subfield code="c">2018</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">p.190-202.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="d">Feb</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Principal agent (PA) is among the most prominent concepts for analyzing the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. Nonethelesss, the inherent bias of PA scholars to attribute moral hazard almost exclusively to the agent, usually referred to as &#xFFFD;bureaucratic drift&#xFFFD;, requires re-examination. Building on the spare literature in which moral hazard of the principal is considered, this paper provides empirical evidence for a neglected aspect of the PA concept. Three cases of German regulatory agencies responsible for drug control, financial services and rail safety are analyzed in critical situations which were largely perceived as bureaucratic failures. The analysis reveals that a good deal of these failures, ranging from negligence to suppressing crucial information, has to be attributed to the political principal. This is called the dark side of power because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility. Turning conventional PA reasoning upside down, the conclusion is that the principal&#xFFFD;s moral hazard should be considered more routinely as a potential explanation for political-bureaucratic interactions. - Reproduced.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Bureaucracy</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Civil service</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Politics and administration</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Politics and government</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">International Journal of Public Administration</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="906" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Bureaucracy</subfield>
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    <subfield code="c">506728</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">506728</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2018-12-07</subfield>
    <subfield code="h">41(3), Feb, 2018: p.190-202.</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">AR118523</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">2018-12-07</subfield>
    <subfield code="w">2018-12-07</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">AR</subfield>
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