01868nam a2200205Ia 4500008004100000100001900041245010900060260000900169300001500178504000800193520117400201650001601375650001801391650003201409650002801441773005101469906001601520999001901536952010701555181130s2018    xx            000 0 und d  aDohler, Marian  aDiscovering the dark side of power: bthe principal�s moral hazard in political-bureaucratic relations  c2018  ap.190-202.  dFeb  aPrincipal agent (PA) is among the most prominent concepts for analyzing the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. Nonethelesss, the inherent bias of PA scholars to attribute moral hazard almost exclusively to the agent, usually referred to as �bureaucratic drift�, requires re-examination. Building on the spare literature in which moral hazard of the principal is considered, this paper provides empirical evidence for a neglected aspect of the PA concept. Three cases of German regulatory agencies responsible for drug control, financial services and rail safety are analyzed in critical situations which were largely perceived as bureaucratic failures. The analysis reveals that a good deal of these failures, ranging from negligence to suppressing crucial information, has to be attributed to the political principal. This is called the dark side of power because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility. Turning conventional PA reasoning upside down, the conclusion is that the principal�s moral hazard should be considered more routinely as a potential explanation for political-bureaucratic interactions. - Reproduced.  aBureaucracy  aCivil service  aPolitics and administration  aPolitics and government  aInternational Journal of Public Administration  aBureaucracy  c506728d506728  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-12-07h41(3), Feb, 2018: p.190-202.pAR118523r2018-12-07w2018-12-07yAR