01394nam a2200145Ia 4500008004100000100001900041245006600060260000900126300001500135520098800150650002501138650001501163700004401178773002601222181130s2018    xx            000 0 und d  aAskim, Jostein  aThe spy who loved me?:bcross-partisans in the core executive  c2018  ap.243-258.  aPolitical appointees from different parties from that of their minister�cross?partisan appointees (CPAs)�are increasingly found in the core executive. Ministerial advisory scholarship has overlooked CPAs, while the coalition governance literature sees them as �spies� and �coalition watchdogs�. This article argues theoretically and demonstrates empirically that this conceptualization is overly limited. The empirical basis is a large?N survey of political appointees from two Norwegian coalitions, and a qualitative follow?up survey of CPAs. The results show that CPAs monitor on behalf of their party, provide cross?partisan advice to their minister and perform many of the same tasks as regular partisan appointees, including exercising independent decision?making power. In this research context, most CPAs act as coalition liaison officers who, rather than create tension and negative dynamics, contribute to building trust between coalition partners. - Reproduced.  aCoalition government  aCoalitions  aKarlsen, Rune and Kolltveit, Kristoffer  aPublic Administration