01290nam a2200193Ia 4500008004100000100002000041245009000061260000900151300001500160504000800175520069500183650001500878650002400893650002600917650003500943650002300978700004401001773005101045181130s2018    xx            000 0 und d  aDetkova, Polina  aCorruption, centralization and competition:bevidence from Russian public procurement  c2018  ap.414-434.  dApr  aThis paper estimates the impact of corruption on the incentives of procurers to maintain honest competition in tenders. Customers, who procure for themselves, and Agencies, who procure for the customers in their region are considered. Basing on a large dataset of open auctions conducted by Russian regional-level authorities in 2011, the analysis shows that in highly corrupt regions, Agencies fail to arrange competitive tenders and most of auctions have one bidder. Customers attract more bidders for large contracts, but rebates are usually low. Therefore, procurement centralization may reduce the corruption of Customers, but cannot solve the problem of low competition. - Reproduced.  aCorruption  aCorruption - Russia  aGovernment purchasing  aGovernment purchasing - Russia  aPublic procurement  aPodkolzina, Elena and Tkachenko, Andrey  aInternational Journal of Public Administration