01284nam a22002057a 4500 507490 507490 190215b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Yamshchiko, Ivan P. 1802 Government and corruption: Scylla and Charybdis 2018 p.880-887. Using public sector employment and corruption perception data for 72 countries across the world, this article demonstrates that despite common notion countries with “smaller” governments do not tend to have lower corruption. Under general assumptions, one can demonstrate that there is an optimal size of public sector employment corresponding to the highest capital intensity. The model has several implications: lower optimal sizes of governments for labor intensive countries and higher sizes for capital intensive ones, possibility to reduce corruption paying a cost of suboptimal output, and a higher “price” of an oversized government for labor intensive countries. - Reproduced. Bureaucracy 1803 Public administration 1804 Public sector 1805 Detkova, Aleksandra 1806 Tikhonov, Alexey 1807 International Journal of Public Administration Corruption ddc AR 0 0 ddc 0 0 381514 IIPA IIPA 2019-02-15 41(11), Aug, 2018: p.880-887. AR118904 2019-02-15 AR