01405nam a22002177a 4500999001900000008004100019100003000060245005300090260000900143300001500152520069800167650002200865650003200887650002400919700003000943700002700973773005101000906001501051942001201066952010901078  c507490d507490190215b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aYamshchiko, Ivan P.91802  aGovernment and corruption:bScylla and Charybdis  c2018  ap.880-887.  aUsing public sector employment and corruption perception data for 72 countries across the world, this article demonstrates that despite common notion countries with “smaller” governments do not tend to have lower corruption. Under general assumptions, one can demonstrate that there is an optimal size of public sector employment corresponding to the highest capital intensity. The model has several implications: lower optimal sizes of governments for labor intensive countries and higher sizes for capital intensive ones, possibility to reduce corruption paying a cost of suboptimal output, and a higher “price” of an oversized government for labor intensive countries. - Reproduced.  aBureaucracy91803  aPublic administration91804  aPublic sector91805  aDetkova, Aleksandra91806  aTikhonov, Alexey91807  aInternational Journal of Public Administration  aCorruption  2ddccAR  00102ddc40709381514aIIPAbIIPAd2019-02-15h41(11), Aug, 2018: p.880-887.pAR118904r2019-02-15yAR