01642nam a2200181   4500999001900000008004100019100002700060245010700087260000900194300001500203520104200218650002001260650001701280773002901297906001401326942001201340952010801352  c509321d509321190501b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aStroh, Alexander94971  aSustaining and jeopardising a credible arbiter: Judicial networks in Benin’s consolidating democracy  c2018  ap.600-615.  aDemocracy greatly benefits from credible courts. If context conditions make democratic consolidation unlikely, as in many African countries, credible arbitration between political actors can be essential for democracy. This article argues that informal judicial networks can critically affect a court’s credibility. Network analysis of Benin’s Constitutional Court using original data on major politicians and all 25 judges who have served between 1993 and 2018 provides evidence that biased judicial networks can jeopardize the crucial role of courts for democratic consolidation. In Benin, the loss of credibility under the Yayi presidency correlates with a clear political representation bias on the constitutional bench whereas socio-cultural representation remained balanced. Since executive and legislative appointment practices account for the network balance or bias, the political creation and privation of informal judicial relations emerges as an interesting avenue for studies of democratic consolidation. - Reproduced.

  aDemocracy94972  aCourts94973  aJournal of Social Policy  aJudiciary  2ddccAR  00102ddc40709383275aIIPAbIIPAd2019-05-01h39(5), Nov, 2018: p.600-615.pAR119545r2019-05-01yAR