01738nam a2200169   4500999001900000008004100019100002600060245009700086260000900183300001500192520115400207650003001361773002901391906002801420942001201448952010801460  c509325d509325190501b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aTrochev, Alexei94984  aPatronal politics, judicial networks and collective judicial autonomy in post-Soviet Ukraine  c2018  ap.662-678.  aHow and why do networks of judges make a difference in judicial politics in patronage-based systems? Judicial networks provide important benefits to both patrons and judges by sharing information about the exchange of concrete rewards and sanctions, generating expectations about the staying power of the patrons and mobilizing judges when needed. These informational and mobilizing practices are at the heart of collective judicial autonomy. Yet judges exercise this autonomy in different ways depending on the presence of a dominant patronage network, the rigidity of the judicial hierarchy with the supreme court on top, and the intensity of intra-judicial conflict. I explore the informational and mobilizing practices of judicial associations – the most visible judicial networks – in post-Soviet Ukraine, a country with a large number of these associations, varying numbers of ruling patronage networks and two attempts at the abolition of the supreme court. Lessons from Ukraine’s judicial clientelism may help explain why competitive politics with vibrant judicial associationalism fail to entrench judicial independence. - Reproduced.  aJudiciary - Ukraine94985  aJournal of Social Policy  aSupreme Court - Ukraine  2ddccAR  00102ddc40709383279aIIPAbIIPAd2019-05-01h39(5), Nov, 2018: p.662-678.pAR119549r2019-05-01yAR