01436nam a2200133   4500008004100000100001900041245008500060260000900145300001500154520106500169650002601234650001601260773002601276190508b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aHegele, Yvonne  aExplaining bureaucratic power in intergovernmental relations: A network approach  c2018  ap.753-768.  aThe core assumption of the bureaucratic politics model and a large part of public administration scholarship is that bureaucrats influence politicians and political decisions via their crucial role in preparing, coordinating and formulating policy. While this influence has been analysed in a vertical direction, that is, how much do bureaucrats influence politicians, the horizontal perspective has been mostly neglected: which bureaucrats are most powerful and influential during the process of bureaucratic coordination and decision‐making? Deducing hypotheses from bargaining theory and testing them with a novel network dataset on German Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), this contribution finds that bureaucrats indeed possess varying degrees of power. Jurisdictional and organizational power resources, such as voting, financial and institutional power, and also party politics, can best explain these variances in bureaucratic power. Personal characteristics, such as experience and education, however, are not used as power resources. - Reproduced.  aPublic administration  aBureaucracy  aPublic Administration