01553nam a2200169 4500 509434 509434 190508b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Hegele, Yvonne 5238 Explaining bureaucratic power in intergovernmental relations: A network approach 2018 p.753-768. The core assumption of the bureaucratic politics model and a large part of public administration scholarship is that bureaucrats influence politicians and political decisions via their crucial role in preparing, coordinating and formulating policy. While this influence has been analysed in a vertical direction, that is, how much do bureaucrats influence politicians, the horizontal perspective has been mostly neglected: which bureaucrats are most powerful and influential during the process of bureaucratic coordination and decision‐making? Deducing hypotheses from bargaining theory and testing them with a novel network dataset on German Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), this contribution finds that bureaucrats indeed possess varying degrees of power. Jurisdictional and organizational power resources, such as voting, financial and institutional power, and also party politics, can best explain these variances in bureaucratic power. Personal characteristics, such as experience and education, however, are not used as power resources. - Reproduced. Public administration 5239 Bureaucracy 5240 Public Administration Intergovernmental relations ddc AR 0 0 ddc 0 0 383378 IIPA IIPA 2019-05-08 96(4), 2018: p.753-768. AR119612 2019-05-08 AR