01595nam a2200157 4500 509552 509552 190514b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Rottinghaus, Brandon 5532 The cost of doing business: congressional requests, cost, and allocation of presidential resources 2018 p.813-825. Executive-legislative interactions operate with cost-benefit trade-offs. Presidents possess several material options in granting Congressional requests to leverage Congressional support but must also marshal these scarce resources. We argue presidents should strategically grant requests from members of Congress for a range of executive actions based upon the cost of the request and the political context. Using an original data set of nearly 4,000 internal Congressional requests made during the Eisenhower, Ford, and H. W. Bush administrations, we find that presidents are strategic in granting requests, where the cost of the request is an important consideration when deciding whether or not to approve a legislator request, especially on executive appointments but not on legislative matters. Ideological proximity to the president matters more than partisanship in granting requests. Presidents are sensitive to cost when ideology is concerned but less so when granting requests to committee chairs. We conclude by highlighting the implications for interbranch bargaining. - Reproduced. Waggoner, Philip D. 5533 Political Research Quarterly Politics and government - United States ddc AR 0 0 ddc 0 0 383491 IIPA IIPA 2019-05-14 71(4), Dec, 2018: p.813-825. AR119709 2019-05-14 AR