01273nam a22001817a 4500999001900000008004100019100002900060245006300089260000900152300001500161520069200176650003100868700002400899773003300923906001400956942001200970952010900982  c509566d509566190514b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aBerton, Raul Magni95563  aAlternation through death: Is gerontocracy an equilibrium?  c2018  ap.975-988.  aAccording to minimalist theories of democracy, the reason why civil conflicts are less frequent in democracies is that opposition parties can reasonably expect to win the next elections: they then prefer to wait than to rebel. In dictatorships, waiting until the dictator dies is generally much costlier. This waiting time, however, is considerably shortened when the dictator is old. Therefore, the risk of domestic conflict should decrease along with the age of autocratic leaders. Based on 160 countries from 1960 to 2008, our empirical analysis shows that the leader’s age decreases the likelihood of violent rebellion in dictatorships, but not in democratic regimes. - Reproduced.  aPolitical leadership95564  aPanel, Sophie95565  aPolitical Research Quarterly  aDemocracy  2ddccAR  00102ddc40709383504aIIPAbIIPAd2019-05-14h 71(4), Dec, 2018: p.975-988.pAR119721r2019-05-14yAR