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    <subfield code="a">Vegetti, Federico</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">The political nature of ideological polarization: the case of Hungary</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">p.78-96.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Polarization in Hungary is one of the most severe cases in Europe. It is predominantly elite-driven, and determined mostly by the antagonistic confrontation between the parties. Left and Right blocs oppose each other in a struggle where the loser is completely denied any influence on policymaking. The two blocs endorse opposing views on socio-cultural policies, but this division emerged as a consequence of the rhetoric and coalitional choices of parties, more than from the societal divisions that they ostensibly represent. Moreover, while the perceived ideological distance between party blocs is wide, the actual programmatic differences in the parties&#x2019; economic and social policy stances are modest. This article draws on a broad range of sources to describe the process of polarization in Hungary after the fall of communism. I discuss how a polarizing style of political competition can lead to a politically divided society and, over the long run, to democratic erosion. - Reproduced.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Vegetti, Federico</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Democracy - Hungary</subfield>
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    <subfield code="h">681, Jan, 2019: p.78-96.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="r">2019-08-02</subfield>
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