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    <subfield code="a">Park, Brandon Beomseob</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Do the welfare benefits weaken the economic vote? a cross-national analysis of the welfare state and economic wing </subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">p.108-125.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Comparative economic voting studies have found great instability in economic voting across countries and over time. In explaining this instability, we highlight the role of welfare systems because strong welfare protection attenuates voters&#x2019; incentives to base their vote on government economic performance. By analyzing 174 legislature elections in 31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 1980 to 2010 and by taking into account clarity of responsibility, we find that welfare protection weakens the linkage between macroeconomic outcomes and incumbent electoral fortunes. This result implies that strong welfare protection enables politicians to avoid blame for economic failures. - Reproduced.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">International Political Science Review</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Welfare state</subfield>
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    <subfield code="h">40(1), Jan, 2019: p.90-107.</subfield>
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