01422nam a2200193   4500999001900000008004100019100003300060245012000093260000900213300001500222520074300237650002400980650002001004700002401024773004301048906001801091942001201109952010701121  c510429d510429190816b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aPark, Brandon Beomseob98538  aDo the welfare benefits weaken the economic vote? a cross-national analysis of the welfare state and economic wing   c2019  ap.108-125.  aComparative economic voting studies have found great instability in economic voting across countries and over time. In explaining this instability, we highlight the role of welfare systems because strong welfare protection attenuates voters’ incentives to base their vote on government economic performance. By analyzing 174 legislature elections in 31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 1980 to 2010 and by taking into account clarity of responsibility, we find that welfare protection weakens the linkage between macroeconomic outcomes and incumbent electoral fortunes. This result implies that strong welfare protection enables politicians to avoid blame for economic failures. - Reproduced.  aSocial policy98429  aElections98430  aShin, Jungsub98431  aInternational Political Science Review  aWelfare state  2ddccAR  00102ddc40709384361aIIPAbIIPAd2019-08-16h40(1), Jan, 2019: p.90-107.pAR120310r2019-08-16yAR