01698nam a2200193   4500999001900000008004100019100002300060245010600083260000900189300001500198520104400213650003201257650002401289700002601313773002601339906002301365942001201388952010401400  c510443d510443190817b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aLiang, Jiaqi98471  aLinking anticorruption threats, performance pay, administrative outputs, and policy outcomes in China  c2019  ap.177-194.  aLittle is known about the effects of two prominent public sector reforms—anticorruption efforts and high‐powered incentive systems—on the accomplishment of policy goals in the absence of the rule of law and in the presence of an extrinsic incentive to take advantage of corruption to achieve performance targets. This study explores how performance rewards and anticorruption efforts jointly affect administrative outputs and policy outcomes. We examine China's air pollution control policy with province‐level panel data. The analysis shows that performance rewards prompt administrative outputs that are linked to the incentive structure. Anticorruption activities have small significant, positive effects on those outputs only prior to the inception of high‐powered rewards, but have no significant effect on policy outcomes, regardless of the measure. The introduction of performance incentives contributes to the achievement of policy outcomes only when their measurement is subject to government manipulation. - Reproduced.  aPublic sector reforms98472  aAir pollution98473  aLangbein, Laura98474  aPublic Administration  aCorruption - China  2ddccAR  00102ddc40709384375aIIPAbIIPAd2019-08-17h97(a), 2019: p.177-194. pAR120324r2019-08-17yAR