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  <controlfield tag="008">180718b2002   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Biglaiser, Glen</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Privatization and democracy: the effects of regime type in the developing world.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">2002</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">p.83-102</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="362" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Feb</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Conventional wisdom holds that high levels of system support serve as an attitutional barrier to democratic breakdown. In unconsolidated democracies, however, where democratic norms are regularly violated, the authors hypothesize that a healthy dose of political skepticism toward the political system, neither extreme rejection nor uncritical support of the system, would be associated with greatesr attitutional resistance to break down in the form of a military coup. Using survey data from Peru, the authors confirm this expectation, showing that the relationship between system support and approval of military coups follows a V-curve pattern. This resarch fails to find interpersonal trust predispose people to reject coups.  The authors found other factors, such as rejection of the use of direct tactics for political purposes, support for the incumbent, and age, that are better predictors of coup support and rejection. -Reproduced.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Democracy</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Danis, Michelle A.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Comparative Political Studies</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="909" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">51189</subfield>
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    <subfield code="c">51189</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">51189</subfield>
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    <subfield code="0">0</subfield>
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    <subfield code="4">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="7">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="h">Volume no: 35, Issue no: 1</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">AR51617</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="w">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">AR</subfield>
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