01577nam a2200169 4500 512440 512440 191122b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Kasdin, Stuart 13705 Contracts, agency vulnerability, and the allocation of federal funds American Review of Public Administration 49(6), Aug, 2019: p.720-732. Legislators have the potential for credit claiming from agency spending in a congressional district only when the awarded contracts or grants are sufficiently large to be noticed or appreciated. Therefore, unlike previous research on distributive politics, we examine the allocation of contracts considering the size of the contracts, not just the overall spending or the numbers of contracts per congressional district. We use a difference-in-difference analysis to evaluate how agencies altered their allocations of contracts in response to the 2006 congressional elections, in which partisan control of the Congress changed to the Democrats. We find that federal agencies responded to the election by allocating larger contracts to Democratic districts. In addition, we find that agencies whose programs received lower scores on the Bush administration’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) allocated larger contracts to Democratic than Republican districts than did agencies whose programs received higher PART ratings. - Reproduced. Contracts 13706 Lin, Luona 13707 American Review of Public Administration Government purchase ddc AR 0 0 ddc 0 0 386495 IIPA IIPA 2019-11-22 49(6), Aug, 2019: p.720-732. AR121812 2019-11-22 AR