01545nam a2200181   4500999001900000008004100019100003200060245006800092260002700160300002800187520093200215650002501147700002601172773002701198906002301225942001201248952010301260  c512653d512653191205b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aHogenauer, Anna-Lena914293  aThe parliamentary scrutiny of euro area national central banks   bPublic Administration   a97(3), 2019: p.576-589.  aEuropean Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) involves several core principles for the organization of participating national central banks (NCBs/CBs), including their independence from political institutions. Early studies show that the level of national parliamentary scrutiny over euro area NCBs varied (Lepper and Sterne 2002). In this context, our article examines the extent to which parliaments make use of four distinct control mechanisms to hold CBs accountable. We explain the very different levels of parliamentary scrutiny over NCBs in Germany, France and Belgium during the 2013–16 period. We find that the level of scrutiny depends principally on the presence of a longstanding tradition of CB independence—and specifically the manner in which independence has been politicized and interpreted by the political class. We argue that the strength of the parliament can also explain some variation. - Reproduced.

   aCentral banks914294  aHowarth, David914295  aPublic Administration   aBanks and banking   2ddccAR  00102ddc40709386708aIIPAbIIPAd2019-12-05h97(3), 2019: p.576-589.pAR121995r2019-12-05yAR