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  <controlfield tag="008">180718b2001   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Taylor, Brian D.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Russias' passive army: rethinking military coup.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">2001</subfield>
  </datafield>
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    <subfield code="a">p.924-52</subfield>
  </datafield>
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    <subfield code="a">Oct</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Military coups are considered most likely when state political capacity is low and the army 's corporate interests are threatened.  However, these conditions are also frequently present in situation in which the military remains politically passive, weakening the explanatory power of these propositions.  In Russia, an extremely weak state coexists with an army whose corporate interests have been threatened over the past decade, yet the military has not intervened in high politics.  Two alternative explanations for this behavior are examined, one based on internal cleavages in the army (organizational structure) and the second on officer corps norms (organizational culture). Although both accounts are plausible, organizational culture provides the best explanation for Russian military passivity.  The importance of this variable is demonstrated in a study of Russian military behavior from 1992 to 1999.  Studying nonevents, and moving beyond the coup/noncoup dichotomy, provides a more complete picture of military behavior in domestic politics. - Reproduced.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Russia. Army</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Armed forces</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Comparative Political Studies</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="909" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">51296</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">51296</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">51296</subfield>
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    <subfield code="0">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="1">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="4">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="7">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="h">Volume no: 34, Issue no: 8</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">AR51724</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="w">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">AR</subfield>
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