01164nam a22001217a 4500008004100000100001800041245002100059260003800080300003100118520077100149650008200920773004001002201020b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aVeit, Walter   aModel pluralism   aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences  a50(1), Mar, 2020: p.91-114  aThis paper introduces and defends an account of model-based science that I dub model pluralism. I argue that despite a growing awareness in the philosophy of science literature of the multiplicity, diversity, and richness of models and modeling-practices, more radical conclusions follow from this recognition than have previously been inferred. Going against the tendency within the literature to generalize from single models, I explicate and defend the following two core theses: (i) any successful analysis of models must target sets of models, their multiplicity of functions within science, and their scientific context and history and (ii) for almost any aspect x of phenomenon y, scientists require multiple models to achieve scientific goal z. - Reproduced   aModelling, Models, Model-based science, Pluralism, Idealization, Methodology   aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences