01460pab a2200169 454500008004000000100001900040245010900059260000900168300001300177520091300190650001501103650002001118773001901138909001001157999001701167952010601184180718b1997   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aHeer, Burkhard  aUnemployment insurance versus welfare payments: a dynamic CGE analysis of employment and welfare effects  c1997  ap.367-93  aThe effects of the social insurance system on employment and welfare are analyzed in a dynamic computable general equilibrium model.  Two instruments of the social insurance system are considered: unemployment compensation, which is only paid to unemployed agents searching for a job, and welfare payments, which are paid to unemployed agents simply enjoying leisure.  The model is calibrated for the German economy in order to get an estimate of the quantitative effects resulting from a change in the social insurance system.  While welfare payments are shown to decrease both employment and welfare, this might not always be the case for unemployment insurance benefits.  In facts, there is a nonzero optimal amount of unemployment insurance benefits.  The welfare gains from a change in the social insurance system are proven to be substantial even after adjusting for transitional effects. - Reproduced.  aEmployment  aSocial security  aPublic Finance  a51459  c51459d51459  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 52, Issue no: 3-4pAR51887r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR