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    <subfield code="a">Action, James M. </subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Cyber warfare &amp; inadvertent escalation </subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">The advent of cyber warfare exacerbates the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict. In theory, cyber espionage and cyberattacks could enhance one state&#x2019;s ability to undermine another&#x2019;s nuclear deterrent. Regardless of how effective such operations might prove in practice, fear of them could generate escalatory &#x201C;use-&#x2019;em-before-you-lose-&#x2019;em&#x201D; pressures. Additionally, cyber threats could create three qualitatively new mechanisms by which a nuclear-armed state might incorrectly conclude that its nuclear deterrent was under attack. First, cyber espionage could be mistaken for a cyberattack. Second, malware could accidentally spread from systems that supported non-nuclear operations to nuclear-related systems. Third, an operation carried out by a third party could be misattributed by one state in a bilateral confrontation to its opponent. Two approaches to risk reduction are potentially viable in the short term: unilateral restraint in conducting potentially escalatory cyber operations, and bilateral or multilateral behavioral norms. &#x2013; Reproduced </subfield>
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    <subfield code="h">149(2), Spring, 2020: p.133-149</subfield>
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