01594nam a22001577a 4500999001900000008004100019100002900060245004400089260001500133300003600148520110200184773001401286906001801300942000701318952011101325  c515709d515709210204b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aAction, James M. 924101  aCyber warfare & inadvertent escalation   aDaedalus    a149(2), Spring, 2020: p.133-149  aThe advent of cyber warfare exacerbates the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict. In theory, cyber espionage and cyberattacks could enhance one state’s ability to undermine another’s nuclear deterrent. Regardless of how effective such operations might prove in practice, fear of them could generate escalatory “use-’em-before-you-lose-’em” pressures. Additionally, cyber threats could create three qualitatively new mechanisms by which a nuclear-armed state might incorrectly conclude that its nuclear deterrent was under attack. First, cyber espionage could be mistaken for a cyberattack. Second, malware could accidentally spread from systems that supported non-nuclear operations to nuclear-related systems. Third, an operation carried out by a third party could be misattributed by one state in a bilateral confrontation to its opponent. Two approaches to risk reduction are potentially viable in the short term: unilateral restraint in conducting potentially escalatory cyber operations, and bilateral or multilateral behavioral norms. – Reproduced   aDaedalus   aCYBER WARFARE  cAR  00102ddc40709389784aIIPAbIIPAd2021-02-04h149(2), Spring, 2020: p.133-149pAR124072r2021-02-04yAR