01862nam a22001697a 4500999001900000008004100019100002600060245003100086260001300117300003500130520135000165650003101515773001501546906001401561942000701575952011001582  c516314d516314210223b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aZucca, Lorenzo925088  aConscience, truth & action  aDaedalus  a149(3), Summer 2020: p.135-147  aLiberal democracies attempt to accommodate conscientious objections without having a clear understanding of the claims of conscience. This might lead to an Antigone claim, when conscience is irreconcilable with state authority. In this essay, I sketch three different models of conscience: a knowledge-based model where conscience gives priority access to moral norms; an emotional model that treats conscience as a natural capability that alerts us to wrongdoing; and a reflection model that argues that conscience works as our inner tribunal. Each model presents a different challenge to political authority. The conflict becomes tragic in Antigone’s sense only when conscience is portrayed as providing knowledge of moral norms. The other two models can be squared with political authority in various ways, but they do not offer a final case for the authority of conscientious claims; at best, they show that political authorities should hear conscientious claims and engage with them in public deliberation. Conscience thus reconstructed can provide a constructive function in any society a) by holding political authorities to account; b) by forcing them to provide reasons for their actions; and, ultimately, c) by refining our deliberative and adjudicative practices to make sure that action is always anchored to truth. - Reproduced 

  aLiberal democracies925089  aDaedalus    aDEMOCRACY  cAR  00102ddc40709390405aIIPAbIIPAd2021-02-23h149(3), Summer 2020: p.135-147pAR124392r2021-02-23yAR