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    <subfield code="a">Liu, Mingtang and Tsai,  Kellee S. </subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Structural power, hegemony, and state capitalism: Limits to china&#x2019;s global economic power</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Politics and Society </subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">49(2), Jun, 2021: p.235-268</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">A comparative historical perspective shows how globalization and the specificities of China&#x2019;s rapid growth era limit its hegemonic potential in the twenty-first century global economy. Although state capitalism and openness to foreign capital facilitated China&#x2019;s economic transformation, interactions among three forms of capital&#x2014;state, private, and foreign&#x2014;have produced developmental dynamics that constrain China&#x2019;s capacity to assume the position of the world&#x2019;s economic hegemon. These include (1) the compromised competitiveness of China&#x2019;s corporate sector due to the domination of state-owned enterprises, (2) limits on the ability of Chinese firms to develop leading transnational corporations, and (3) early openness to and continued dependence on foreign capital. Moreover, the party-state&#x2019;s efforts to ameliorate these constraints arouse external suspicion rather than support a Chinese-led hegemonic order based on consent and shared interests. These historically conditioned realities should temper expectations that China is converging teleologically toward a familiar hegemonic role in the international economy. &#x2013; Reproduced </subfield>
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    <subfield code="h">49(2), Jun, 2021: p.235-268</subfield>
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