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  <titleInfo>
    <title>How wage announcements affect job search : a field experiment</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Belot, M., Kircher, P. and Muller, P.</namePart>
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      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
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    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
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  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
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  <physicalDescription>
    <form authority="marcform">print</form>
    <extent>14(4), Oct, 2022: p.1-67</extent>
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  <abstract>In a field experiment, we study how job seekers respond to posted wages by assigning wages randomly to pairs of otherwise similar vacancies in a large number of professions. Higher wages attract significantly more interest. Still, a nontrivial number of applicants only reveal an interest in the low-wage vacancy. With a complementary survey, we show that external raters perceive higher-wage jobs as more competitive. These findings qualitatively support core predictions of theories of directed/competitive search, though in the simplest calibrated model, applications react too strongly to the wage. We discuss extensions such as on-the-job search that rectify this. – Reproduced </abstract>
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    <name>
      <namePart> American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics </namePart>
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    <recordCreationDate encoding="marc">221207</recordCreationDate>
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