01146nam a22001097a 4500008004100000100004400041245010400085260003500189300003500224520074200259773003501001221226b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aCaberal, M., Cui, C. and Dworsky, M.I.   aThe demand for insurance and rationale for a mandate: Evidence from workers' compensation insurance  aThe American Economic Review    a112(5), May, 2022: p.1621-1668  aWorkers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure—such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities—may not justify a mandate in this setting.- Reproduced   aThe American Economic Review