01229nam a22001457a 4500 521188 521188 221226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Caberal, M., Cui, C. and Dworsky, M.I. 36405 The demand for insurance and rationale for a mandate: Evidence from workers' compensation insurance The American Economic Review 112(5), May, 2022: p.1621-1668 Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure—such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities—may not justify a mandate in this setting.- Reproduced The American Economic Review INSURANCE AR 0 0 ddc 0 0 395240 IIPA IIPA 2022-12-26 112(5), May, 2022: p.1621-1668 AR127742 2022-12-26 AR