01076nam a22001097a 4500008004100000100004200041245005300083260003500136300003500171520072500206773003500931221226b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aAryal, G., Bhuller, M. and Lange, F.   aSignaling and employer learning with instruments  aThe American Economic Review    a112(5), May, 2022: p.1669-1702  aThis paper considers the use of instruments to identify and estimate private and social returns to education within a model of employer learning. What an instrument identifies depends on whether it is hidden from, or transparent (i.e., observed) to, the employers. A hidden instrument identifies private returns to education, and a transparent instrument identifies social returns to education. We use variation in compulsory schooling laws across noncentral and central municipalities in Norway to, respectively, construct hidden and transparent instruments. We estimate a private return of 7.9 percent, of which 70 percent is due to increased productivity and the remaining 30 percent is due to signaling.- Reproduced   aThe American Economic Review