<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<mods xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" version="3.1" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-1.xsd">
  <titleInfo>
    <title>Signaling and employer learning with instruments</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Aryal, G., Bhuller, M. and Lange, F.</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">The American Economic Review</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
  </language>
  <physicalDescription>
    <form authority="marcform">print</form>
    <extent>112(5), May, 2022: p.1669-1702</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <abstract>This paper considers the use of instruments to identify and estimate private and social returns to education within a model of employer learning. What an instrument identifies depends on whether it is hidden from, or transparent (i.e., observed) to, the employers. A hidden instrument identifies private returns to education, and a transparent instrument identifies social returns to education. We use variation in compulsory schooling laws across noncentral and central municipalities in Norway to, respectively, construct hidden and transparent instruments. We estimate a private return of 7.9 percent, of which 70 percent is due to increased productivity and the remaining 30 percent is due to signaling.- Reproduced </abstract>
  <relatedItem type="host">
    <name>
      <namePart>The American Economic Review  </namePart>
    </name>
  </relatedItem>
  <recordInfo>
    <recordCreationDate encoding="marc">221226</recordCreationDate>
  </recordInfo>
</mods>
