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  <titleInfo>
    <title>Raising the bar: Minimum wages and employers' hiring standards</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Butschek, Sebastian</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
  </language>
  <physicalDescription>
    <form authority="marcform">print</form>
    <extent>14(2), May, 2022: p.91-124</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <abstract>Many scholars have studied the employment effects of minimum wages, but little is known about effects on the composition of hires. I investigate whether Germany's minimum wage introduction raised hiring standards, using worker fixed effects as a proxy for worker productivity. For the least productive workers hired, the minimum wage led to a 4 percentile point shift in the productivity distribution. This increase is missed using standard observable measures of worker productivity. The effects are larger with greater pre-reform screening intensity—indicating an employer response. This more selective hiring compensates about two-thirds of higher wage costs for the least productive hires.- Reproduced</abstract>
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    <name>
      <namePart>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy  </namePart>
    </name>
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  <recordInfo>
    <recordCreationDate encoding="marc">221226</recordCreationDate>
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