<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<mods xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" version="3.1" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-1.xsd">
  <titleInfo>
    <title>A reputational theory of firm dynamics</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Board, Simon and Ter-Vehn, Moritz Meyer</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
  </language>
  <physicalDescription>
    <form authority="marcform">print</form>
    <extent>14(2), May, 2022: p.44-80</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <abstract>We study the life cycle of a firm that produces a good of unknown quality. The firm manages its quality by investing while consumers learn via public breakthroughs; if the firm fails to generate such breakthroughs, its revenue falls and it eventually exits. Optimal investment depends on the firm's reputation (the market's belief about its quality) and self-esteem (the firm's own belief about its quality), and is single-peaked in the time since a breakthrough. We derive predictions about the distribution of revenue and propose a method to decompose the impact of policy changes into investment and selection effects. – Reproduced </abstract>
  <relatedItem type="host">
    <name>
      <namePart>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics </namePart>
    </name>
  </relatedItem>
  <recordInfo>
    <recordCreationDate encoding="marc">221226</recordCreationDate>
  </recordInfo>
</mods>
