01327nam a22001577a 4500999001900000008004100019100005200060245004700112260003600159300003400195520077200229773003601001906001601037942000701053952010901060  c522441d522441230411b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aLanteri, Andrea and Rampini, Adriano A. 940046  aConstrained-efficient capital reallocation  aThe American: Economic Reviews   a113(2), Feb, 2023: p. 354-395  aWe characterize efficiency in an equilibrium model of investment and capital reallocation with heterogeneous firms facing collateral constraints. The model features two types of pecuniary externalities: collateral externalities, because the resale price of capital affects collateral constraints, and distributive externalities, because buyers of old capital are more financially constrained than sellers, consistent with empirical evidence. We prove that the stationary equilibrium price of old capital is inefficiently high because the distributive externality exceeds the collateral externality, by a factor of two when we calibrate the model. New investment reduces the future price of old capital, providing a rationale for new-investment subsidies.- Reproduced   aThe American: Economic Reviews   aINVEESTMENT  cAR  00102ddc40709397443aIIPAbIIPAd2023-04-11h113(2), Feb, 2023: p. 354-395pAR128638r2023-04-11yAR