01308pab a2200169 454500008004000000100003200040245004200072260000900114300001400123362000800137520087000145650002301015650002201038700002201060700002101082773003501103180718b2002   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aMilest-Ferretti, Gian Maria  aElectoral systems and public spending  c2002  ap.609-55.  aMay  aWe study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries.  We emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups.  We present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policymaking under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems.  The model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems when the share of transfer spending is high (low).  After defining rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation, we find considerable support for our predictions. - Reproduced.  apublic expenditure  aElectoral systems  aRostagno, Massimo  aPerotti, Roberto  aQuarterly Journal of Economics