01085nam a22001457a 4500 523648 523648 230915b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Sturm, John 43731 How should sanctions account for bystander countries? AEA Papers and Proceedings 113, May, 2023: p.39-42 Neutral "bystander countries" have profoundly shaped the impact of trade sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. How should sanctions account for the presence of such bystanders? I study this question in a simple trade model where a sanctioning country places tariffs on imports from a sanctioned country in the presence of a neutral third country. Optimal tariffs-as-sanctions are lower on goods that the sanctioner can import from bystanders. On goods that the sanctionee can export to bystanders, tariffs-as-sanctions are higher given an elasticity of (excess) supply to the sanctioner but lower given a total elasticity of supply.- Reproduced AEA Papers and Proceedings FINANCIAL SANCTIONS AR 0 0 ddc 0 0 398696 IIPA IIPA 2023-09-15 113, May, 2023: p.39-42 AR129552 2023-09-15 AR 0 0 ddc 0 0 398697 IIPA IIPA 2023-09-15 113, May, 2023: p.39-42 AR129553 2023-09-15 AR