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  <titleInfo>
    <title>How should sanctions account for bystander countries?</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Sturm, John</namePart>
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    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">AEA Papers and Proceedings</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
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  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
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    <extent>113, May, 2023: p.39-42</extent>
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  <abstract>Neutral "bystander countries" have profoundly shaped the impact of trade sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. How should sanctions account for the presence of such bystanders? I study this question in a simple trade model where a sanctioning country places tariffs on imports from a sanctioned country in the presence of a neutral third country. Optimal tariffs-as-sanctions are lower on goods that the sanctioner can import from bystanders. On goods that the sanctionee can export to bystanders, tariffs-as-sanctions are higher given an elasticity of (excess) supply to the sanctioner but lower given a total elasticity of supply.- Reproduced </abstract>
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